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Abstract 
The paper examines the economic consequences of Japanese colonialism in Taiwan, Korea and 
Manchuria in the years from 1910 to 1945, and compares Japanese policies with those implemented by 
other colonial powers in Southeast Asia. In particular it addresses the writings of an influential group of 
American scholars who have published widely on Japanese colonial policies over the last fifty years. 
Their work has been used to support the argument that Japanese colonial policy was more 
developmental than that of other colonial powers, and laid the foundations for the stellar economic 
performance of Taiwan and the Republic of Korea in the decades after 1950. The paper challenges this 
argument by comparing a number of economic and social indicators in Korea, Taiwan and Manchuria 
with those from other Asian colonies and also from Thailand. The main conclusion is that while the 
Japanese colonies, especially Taiwan, score well on some indicators, they do less well on others. The 
idea of Japanese exceptionalism cannot be accepted uncritically. 
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1 
This paper seeks to examine the economic consequences of Japanese colonialism in 
Taiwan, Korea and Manchuria in the years from 1910 to 1945, and to compare Japanese 
policies with those implemented by other European powers, especially in Southeast Asia. 
In particular it addresses the writings of an influential group of American scholars, 
several based at Stanford University, who have published widely on Japanese colonial 
policies over the last fifty years. They contributed to several edited volumes and also 
authored a number of journal articles examining the economic consequences of Japanese 
colonialism in Taiwan, Korea and Manchuria, as well as examining Japan’s informal 
empire in Asia. These writers were not for the most part Japanese, although most had a 
deep knowledge of Japanese language as well as Western sources.  To some extent, they 
were reacting against the work of Japanese scholars writing after 1945, who tended to be 
critical of aspects of Japanese colonialism (Myers 1984).  
  
By the 1980s, when rapid economic growth in both Taiwan and the Republic of 
(South) Korea (ROK) was attracting attention from around the world, these scholars 
stressed the more positive aspects of the Japanese legacy, including the agricultural 
transformation, and especially the successful transfer of higher-yielding rice varieties, as 
well as the development of industry and transport infrastructure. They also discussed the 
Japanese emphasis on expanding access to education. Gradually, this work has been used 
to support a ‘new orthodoxy’ which has stressed Japanese colonial exceptionalism. This 
orthodoxy has been propagated by scholars who are not themselves authorities on Asian 
economic development. For example, Landes (1998: 437) has argued that ‘the best 
colonial master of all time has been Japan, for no ex-colonies have done so well as 
2 
(South) Korea and Taiwan’. The assumption of Landes, and indeed other writers who are 
better known authorities on the economic history of Asia is that the stellar performance of 
these two economies since 1960 must be due, in part at least, to the Japanese legacy.
1
  
 
There are some obvious criticisms of the arguments put forward by Landes and 
other authors who stress the developmental legacy of Japanese colonialism. One is that 
North Korea and Manchuria, which accounted for around 70 per cent of the total 
population of Japanese colonies in 1938, have not performed nearly as well as Taiwan 
and South Korea (ROK) in the second half of the 20
th
 century. While it is true that the 
three Manchurian provinces still had a higher per capita GDP than the average for the rest 
of China in the early years of the 21
st
 century, they had not achieved the level of 
development of Taiwan or the ROK. North Korea, now ruled by the third generation of 
the Kim family, has become a development disaster. So Japanese ‘developmental 
colonialism’ seems to have left a much more positive legacy in some parts of the former 
Japanese empire than in others. Another problem is that much of the writing by 
mainstream economists on the economic miracle in both Taiwan and ROK has taken the 
1960s as the starting point. It ignores the very difficult decades from the late 1930s to the 
late 1950s, when there were steep declines in real GDP, and a slow recovery. According 
to recent estimates, Taiwan only regained the 1938 level of per capita GDP in 1962. The 
ROK had a lower per capita GDP than Taiwan in the late 1930s, and regained the 1938 
level by 1953, although the absolute level was below Taiwan, and growth through the rest 
                                                          
1 See for example Cumings (1999) who compares Korea with Vietnam, and Kohli (2004) who compares Korea with 
India, Nigeria and Brazil.  
3 
of the 1950s was not very fast.
2
 Arguably, the growth miracles which occurred post-1960 
in both countries were more influenced by the policy responses to the problems of the 
late 1940s and 1950s than by the period of Japanese control. 
 
A further reason for revising the writing on Japanese colonialism is that it does 
not engage with the rapidly growing literature on colonialism in other parts of Asia, or 
only in a very superficial way. A common assumption seems to be that British, Dutch, 
French and American colonial regimes in Asia did not promote economic growth and 
structural diversification, left behind institutions which were extractive rather than 
inclusive, and did very little to improve living standards.  This paper challenges these 
views by examining the evidence on economic growth and structural change in the major 
colonies of East and Southeast Asia. It also looks at the role of government, the 
emergence of indigenous entrepreneurs, and changes in education and living standards. 
Finally the paper asks whether the Japanese colonies were more profitable to the 
metropolitan economy than those in other parts of Asia. 
 
1. Growth and Structural Change in Asia: 1900-1940 
In 1913, the estimates given by the Maddison Project show that per capita GDP in colonial Asia 
(in 1990 international dollars) varied from $673 in India to $988 in the Philippines, and $1367 in 
Singapore.
3
 There was considerable variation in growth rates between 1913 and 1941. In per 
                                                          
2 These figures are taken from the Maddison Project update of the data on per capita GDP given in Maddison (2003). 
See the website of the Maddison-Project http://www.ggdc.net/maddison/maddison-project/home.htm, 2013 version. For 
further discussion of the aims of the project, see Bolt and van Zanden (2014).  
3 These figures are taken from the revised figures given in the Maddison Project website; see 
http://www.ggdc.net/maddison/maddison-project/home.htm, 2013 version. Singapore did not exist as a separate entity 
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capita terms, growth was positive between 1913 and 1929 in most parts of colonial Asia, with 
Taiwan having the fastest growth and India the slowest. Korean growth until 1929 was no faster 
than in the Philippines, and not much different from Burma or Indonesia (Table 1).  
 
Table 1: Growth in Per capita GDP, Selected Asian Colonies, 1902-40 (1929=100) 
 
Country  1902 1913 1929 1934 1940* 
 
Korea  n.a 77 100 112 145 
Taiwan  54 65 100 101 100 
Manchuria  n.a  90** 100 81 121  
 
Philippines  47 74 100 95 106 
Indonesia  64 80 100 86 104 
India  90 92 100 96 94 
Burma ***  77 68 100 93 82  
Thailand  93 106 100 n.a 104  
Singapore  58 59 100 81 102 
 
 
 
Note: * 1938 for Thailand; 1939 for Singapore. ** 1924. *** Figures refer to 1901/02, 1911/12, 1931/32, 
1936/7 and 1938/9 . 
Sources: Korea: Kim et al (2008: 406-11); Taiwan: Sato et al (2008: 231-3); Manchuria: Chao (1983; Table 
A-3); the Philippines: Hooley (2005: Table A.1); population data from Bureau of Census and Statistics 
(1941: 13). Indonesia: van der Eng (2013); India: Sivasubramonian (2002: 136); Burma: Aye Hlaing(1965: 
289); Thailand: Sompop (1989: 251); Singapore: Sugimoto (2011: 49, 185).  
 
 
After 1929, there was a more obvious divergence between Korea and Manchuria compared with 
other parts of colonial Asia. All the European colonies in Asia, and in the Philippines, 
experienced a fall in per capita GDP between 1929 and 1934, although there was some recovery 
in Indonesia and the Philippines after 1934. Taiwan experienced little growth in per capita terms 
over the 1930s. 
                                                                                                                                                                             
in the 1930s; it was part of the larger territory known as the Straits Settlements, which in turn was one component in 
British Malaya. Estimates of national income for Singapore alone from 1900 to 2000 are given in Sugimoto (2011).  
5 
 
Manchuria, which had become the state of Manchukuo in 1932, under strict Japanese 
control, suffered a severe economic downturn in 1934. This was in part the result of the change of 
regime, although Chao (1979: 257) argued that the main reason for the poor performance was that 
Manchuria had fallen into a staple trap when the world market for its main export crop, soybeans, 
collapsed after 1930.
4
 Both production and exports fell sharply.
5
 The Japanese response was to 
implement a policy of economic diversification into mining and industry. This was also their 
strategy in both Korea and Taiwan. The result was accelerated economic growth after 1934, 
especially in Korea, but also in Manchuria. In Taiwan, per capita GDP reached a peak in 1938. 
But after that there was a decline, and by 1940, per capita GDP was about the same as the 1929 
estimate. In British India, per capita GDP in 1940 was still below the 1929 level, although in both 
Indonesia and the Philippines the estimate for 1940 was above those for 1929. Perhaps the most 
surprising result of all was from independent Thailand, where there was virtually no growth in per 
capita terms between 1913 and 1938.
6
  
 
What explains the better growth performance in the Japanese colonies, especially in Korea 
and Manchuria, over the 1930s? The main reason was that their trade and investment were tightly 
linked to the Japanese economy which experienced faster growth over the 1930s compared with 
the major economies in West Europe and America. Over the 1930s the Japanese colonies 
                                                          
4 Bix (1971: 178) argued that the reliance on one staple crop was an important reason for the widespread poverty in 
Manchuria even before prices fell in the 1930s. But it is also probable that the monetary crisis in China in the early 
1930s, which was caused by the fall in the international price of silver had some impact on Manchuria, and led to the 
full integration of Manchuria into the yen bloc. See Shiroyama (2008: 170-1) and Nish (2016: 176-7).   
5 An analysis of the impact of the creation of Manchukuo on agricultural output is given by Sun (1969: 57ff). He argues 
that, after adjustments to the official data, the production of the main agricultural crops never regained the level of the 
late 1920s.  
6 For a detailed discussion of growth in Thailand from 1870 to 1950 see Sompop (1989), and Booth (2016).  
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continued to invest in both infrastructure (especially transport) and in directly productive 
activities, including agriculture, mining, and manufacturing. By 1938, gross domestic capital 
formation in Manchuria was 23.5 per cent of GDP, although the proportion was lower in Taiwan 
and Korea
7
. In all parts of the Japanese empire, government played a key role in promoting 
investment in both infrastructure and in productive activities, offering considerable subsidies to 
the private sector. Comparative data show that length of road and railways in relation to area were 
higher in Taiwan and Korea than in any of the Southeast Asian colonies except Java (Booth 2007: 
80). 
 
 While Dutch, French, British and American colonial administrations were all aware of the 
importance of investment in infrastructure, government investment was constrained by 
conservative fiscal policies, especially after 1930. Over the 1930s, the world slump had an 
adverse impact on export revenues, which in turn affected government revenues. In Indonesia, 
government spending on public works, including irrigation, harbor works, transport and railways 
reached a peak in real terms in 1921, and fell thereafter. In the 1930s spending on new projects 
was negligible (de Jong and Ravesteijn 2008: 66). But in spite of these cutbacks, in 1938 road and 
rail densities in Java compared favourably with those in Taiwan and Korea, although outside Java 
there was much less development, with the exception of those regions where there were 
agricultural estates, or large-scale mining operations. In Manchuria, a rail system had been 
developed by the Russians, and taken over by the Japanese early in the 20
th
 century. The Japanese 
also developed the road system although by the late 1930s, the road density (36 kilometers per 
thousand square kilometers) was about the same as in Indochina, and less than in Burma or the 
                                                          
7 The Manchurian figure is taken from Chao (1979: 258-61). Those from Taiwan and Korea are taken from Mizoguchi 
and Umemura (1988: 226-38). 
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Philippines. Investment in electricity generation in Southeast Asia was left to the private sector, 
and, with the exception of British Malaya, installed capacity was much lower in the Southeast 
Asian colonies than in Taiwan and Korea (Booth 2007: 80). In the Japanese colonies links 
between the government and private investors was much tighter, to the extent that it was often 
difficult to disentangle public and private initiatives.  
 
 As would be expected, the economic growth which occurred across most of colonial Asia 
from 1913 to 1940 led to some structural change in the composition of both output and 
employment. The share of agriculture fell as a percentage of total output, and that of industry 
(mining, manufacturing, construction and utilities) increased. The sharpest fall in the share of 
agriculture occurred in Korea and Manchuria, while in the Philippines and Thailand there was 
little change (Table 2).  
 
Table 2: Proportion of GDP from Agriculture: Selected Colonies, 1913-1941 
  1913 1924  1929 1934 1938/41* 
  
Korea  66.9 56.9 52.3 49.7 36.0 
Taiwan  45.2 47.2 42.2 45.6 39.1 
Manchuria**  n.a 49.7 50.7 36.2 (52.7) 33.9 (31.3) 
 
Philippines  38.5 37.8 39.1 40.8 37.3 
Indonesia  38.3 36.6 32.5 34.3 32.4 
India  60.0 59.9 56.1 54.7 50.3 
Burma***  68.6 55.6 55.6 59.9 54.3 
Thailand  44.6 n.a 43.8 n.a 44.3  
 
 
8 
Note: *1938 data for Thailand; 1940 data for Korea and the Philippines; 1941 for all others except Burma. 
** Figures in brackets are estimated from Yamanata et al (2008). ***Burma percentages refer to 1911-12, 
1921-22, 1926-27, 1931-32, 1938-39. 
Sources:  Korea: Kim et al (2008: 406-9); Taiwan: Sato et al (2008: 233, 326); Manchuria: Chao (1983: 
16); the Philippines: Hooley (2005: Table A.1); population data from Bureau of Census and Statistics 
(1941: 13). Indonesia: van der Eng (2013); India: Sivasubramaniam (2002: 136); Burma: Saito and Lee 
(1999: 7, 214); Thailand: Sompop (1989: 251). 
 
The decline in the share of agriculture in the Japanese colonies was accompanied by an increase 
in the share of the industrial sector; by 1938 industry accounted for around 28 per cent of total 
GDP in Korea, 24 per cent in Taiwan and 20 per cent in Korea (Table 3). Industry accounted for 
around 20 per cent of total GDP in the Philippines, but a lower proportion in Indonesia, India and 
Thailand. The reason for these outcomes will be discussed further below.  
 
Table 3: Proportion of GDP from Industry*: Selected Colonies, 1913-1941 
  
  1913 1924  1929 1934 1938/41** 
  
Korea  6.4 10.4 12.3 15.6 27.9 
Taiwan  12.1 15.7 21.3 20.6 23.7 
Manchuria***  n.a 14.7 12.9 19.8 (9.5) 20.3 (19.5) 
 
Philippines  16.1 18.8 18.5 23.8 19.6 
Indonesia  16.1 14.3 15.6 13.1 17.6 
India  12.3 11.5 13.5 14.6 13.7 
Thailand  17.1 n.a 17.1 n.a 17.3  
 
 
Note: *Mining, manufacturing, construction and utilities. **1938 data for Thailand; 1940 data for Korea 
and the Philippines; 1941 for all other countries. ***Figures in brackets from Yamanata et al (2008) 
Sources:  Korea: Kim et al (2008: 406-9);  Taiwan: Sato et al (2008: 233, 326); Manchuria: Chao (1983: 
16); the Philippines: Hooley (2005: Table A.1); Indonesia: van der Eng (2013); India: Sivasubramaniam 
(2002: 136); Thailand: Sompop (1989: 251). 
 
9 
What impact did the growth of output in the various colonies have on patterns of 
employment? By the late 1930s, the available data, mainly from population censuses, showed that 
around 25 per cent of the labour force was employed outside agriculture in Korea and Manchuria, 
and 36 per cent in Taiwan. In the Philippines, the 1939 Population Census showed that 31 per cent 
of the working population was employed outside agriculture.
8
 Population censuses held in Burma 
in 1931, and in Indonesia in 1930 both found that around 30 per cent were employed outside 
agriculture; this proportion probably increased over the 1930s.
9
 In British Malaya, the 1931 
Census found that the percentage was close to 40 (Booth 2007: 30). In all these colonies, the 
majority of workers employed outside agriculture were in wholesale and retail trade and other 
services with a smaller proportion in manufacturing industry, construction and mining. But 
growing numbers were also employed in government administration and the professions. By the 
1930s, indigenous workers comprised the great majority of those employed in government and the 
professions in the Philippines, Indonesia, Thailand and Burma. The percentage was lower in 
Taiwan and Korea where Japanese workers were more numerous (Booth 2007: 127).  
 
Growth of Agriculture and Industry   
Most studies of agricultural development in both Taiwan and Korea in the decades from 1910 to 
1940 have stressed the successful transfer of Japanese high-yielding rice varieties, although in 
both colonies the period of accelerated agricultural growth was quite short. Lee and Chen (1979: 
                                                          
8 The 1939 labour force data for the Philippines included workers in domestic and personal services including 
housekeepers and housewives. As these workers were not included in other censuses carried out in the 1930s, the 
Philippine census is not strictly comparable. The inclusion of domestic workers has more impact on the female labour 
force data; the male data show that 29 per cent of workers were in non-agricultural occupations. See Commonwealth of 
the Philippines (1941: 505).  
9 A population census, planned for 1940 in Indonesia, never took place; the 1941 census in Burma did go ahead but the 
data were lost in the Japanese invasion. 
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60-62) found that there were three distinct phases of growth in Taiwanese agriculture during the 
Japanese era. In the first, from 1913 to 1923, growth in gross value added in agriculture was quite 
modest at 1.9 per cent per annum; in these years expansion of cultivated area was the main factor 
contributing to the growth in output. The second phase, from 1923 to 1937, was marked by 
accelerated growth in output and value added to around four per cent per annum, which resulted 
from both yields growth and further growth in cultivated area. This was the period when 
production of the ponlai rice variety took off, mainly for export to the Japanese market (Barker 
and Herdt 1985: 56-7). Sugar production, entirely for the Japanese market, also grew rapidly. The 
third phase from 1937 to 1945 saw a decline in output, as a result of bad weather, and wartime 
dislocation, which meant that Japan could no longer supply crucial inputs such as fertilizer. It also 
became increasingly difficult to transport rice, sugar and other products to the Japanese market.  
 
Ban (1979: 92) also distinguished three phases in the growth of agricultural output in 
Korea. During the 1920s, growth in agricultural output was slow; gross value added grew at only 
around 0.3 per cent per annum. Japanese attempts to increase rice production were plagued by 
problems, including farmer resistance. Output growth did increase over the 1930s, to 2.9 per cent 
per annum, mainly as a result of increasing fertilizer application in rice production, together with 
the dissemination of higher yielding varieties. The percentage of rice land under irrigation also 
increased, permitting more double cropping. From 1930 to 1939, gross value added grew at 
around 2.6 per cent per annum. But as in Taiwan, agricultural growth was negative in the years 
from 1939 to 1945. The reasons were similar; less fertilizer was available to Korean farmers and 
11 
marketing channels were broken as transport to and from mainland Japan became increasingly 
disrupted.
10
  
 
In Manchuria, gross value added in agriculture fell steeply between 1929 and 1934 (Chao 
1982: 32), mainly because of the collapse in world markets for soybean. Myers (1982: 95) argued 
that from 1932 to 1937, Japanese agricultural policy in Manchuria was ‘vague’, with little attempt 
to grapple with the rural depression. Cadastral surveys were carried out, mainly to facilitate the 
implementation of a land tax. An important concern of the Japanese government after 1932 was to 
settle large numbers of Japanese farmers together with soldiers retiring from the Kwantung army 
on land in Manchuria. But Japanese were reluctant to move and the targets were never achieved.
11
 
With the implementation of the five-year plan in 1937, agricultural policy became more activist, 
and government controls over pricing more pervasive. By 1939, output of staple farm crops had 
increased from the very low level of 1934, but was still below the 1929 figure (Chao 1982: 32). 
Area under cultivation expanded, but yields per hectare fell, suggesting diminishing returns 
(Schumpeter 1940: 302). 
 
In Southeast Asia, the forces driving agricultural growth after 1900 were different from 
those in the Japanese colonies. Especially after 1918, Japanese policy in both Korea and Taiwan 
                                                          
10 Barker and Herdt (1985: 42) find that the annual average growth rate in rice production in Korea between 1911-20 
and 1931-40 was only 1.1 per cent per annum. This was slower than in Taiwan (3.2 per cent) or in the Philippines (3.5 
per cent), British Malaya (3.0 per cent), Thailand (1.7 per cent) and Java (1.4 per cent). Only Indochina and Burma had 
lower growth rates.  
11 Lasker (1945: 100) states that in 1936 the Japanese government planned to settle 100,000 families (around 500,000 
people) in Manchuria, but by 1943 only around 57,000 households had actually moved. There were also over 100,000 
youth volunteer and other workers, but how many were involved in agriculture is unclear. In some districts, both 
Chinese and Korean farmers were evicted from their land in order to give it to Japanese settlers, and little or no 
compensation was paid (Yamamuro 2006: 202-6). See also Nish (2016: 190).  
12 
emphasized food self-sufficiency within the empire; in practice this meant increased production 
of rice, sugar and other crops for shipment to the Japanese market. In Southeast Asia, agricultural 
production was determined to a much greater extent by global market demand. Rice exports from 
the three deltas (South Vietnam, Central Thailand and Southern Burma) grew rapidly after 1870 
(Owen 1971). Most of these exports went to rice-deficit parts of Asia, including eastern and 
southern India, British Malaya, Indonesia and the Philippines. In Indonesia and British Malaya 
new staples such as rubber and palm oil were cultivated on large estates, and exported to both 
European and American markets. Smallholder production of rubber also increased in the 1920s, 
especially in Indonesia where smallholder production of other export crops such as coffee, pepper 
and spices also grew. In the Philippines production of sugar and tropical fruits developed rapidly, 
mainly oriented to the American market. Much of the growth in output of export crops across 
Southeast Asia came from bringing more land under cultivation, although large estates invested in 
research into higher yielding varieties of both sugar and rubber. In some parts of Southeast Asia, 
notably Java, there was substantial government investment in irrigation systems which led to an 
increase in double-cropping, but little change in yields. By the 1930s, the double-cropping ratio 
on riceland in Java was estimated to be around 1.4 (Booth 1988: 102).  
 
David and Barker (1979: 119) found that Philippine agricultural output (in 1938 prices) 
grew at around four per cent per annum between 1902 and 1938. This would appear to be much 
faster than in either Taiwan or Korea. But when the data are broken into two sub-periods, 1902-18 
and 1918-38, there was a very sharp decline in the growth rate (from seven per cent per annum to 
1.1 per cent per annum). The very rapid growth in the earlier period was from a very low base. 
The available evidence suggests that agricultural output in the early 1900s was lower than in the 
13 
1890s, because of drought, cattle disease, and the impact of the Philippine-American War. After 
1918, their estimates show falling land and labour productivity, which persisted until 1938.  
 
In both Thailand and Indonesia, the national accounts data prepared by Sompop (1989) 
and van der Eng (2010) both show that value added in the agricultural sector grew at around two 
per cent per annum between 1900 and the late 1930s. Unlike in the Philippines, there does not 
seem to have been a marked slowdown after 1918; in Thailand growth over the 1930s was 
actually higher than in the 1900-38 period as a whole. In Indonesia there was also an acceleration 
in agricultural growth, to slightly over two per cent per annum after 1920. In Burma, the data on 
value added in agriculture assembled by Aye Hlaing show an increasing trend from 1901/2 to 
1931/2, albeit with fluctuations. The 1930s saw a decline in value added of around 3.1 per cent 
per annum (Saito and Lee 1999: 214). Although world prices of most export staples fell after 
1918, production continued to increase in most parts of Southeast Asia until the late 1920s, and in 
some cases into the 1930s. Smallholders proved to be more resilient in the face of adverse 
international market trends than large estates, and gained a greater market share for crops such as 
rubber. 
 
To sum up, the evidence indicates that there was considerable variation in the Japanese 
colonies and in Southeast Asia in agricultural performance in the first four decades of the 20
th
 
century. While output growth in Taiwan was faster than in most other regions, the performance of 
both Manchuria and Korea was less impressive. Myers and Yamada (1984: 446-8) argue that 
Taiwan benefited from an earlier start in the adoption of the Meiji agrarian strategy, together with 
large investments in agriculture. They stressed the positive impact of greater market exchange 
14 
within the colony and greater trade with Japan. But they also drew attention to ‘two dysfunctions, 
economic in character’ which affected all areas of rural life in both Taiwan and Korea. The first 
was the unequal distribution of wealth and income in rural areas, which resulted from the very 
unequal distribution of land, while the second was the low income and purchasing power of rural 
populations. These problems were not unique to the Japanese colonies; their impact on living 
standards will be discussed further below.  
 
 One consequence of the sustained growth in agricultural output in most colonies in East 
and Southeast Asia in the early decades of the 20
th
 century was the rapid growth of agricultural 
processing industries. Rice milling was important almost everywhere, as was saw-milling; these 
two industries dominated manufacturing output in Thailand and Burma. In Java and the 
Philippines, the role of sugar refining increased from the late 19
th
 century onwards. The 
processing of natural rubber into a form which could be exported to the USA and Europe also 
became important in both British Malaya and Indonesia. By 1925 Singapore had become the main 
port for the processing and onward shipment of rubber from both British Malaya and Indonesia 
(Huff 1994: 195-203). In Taiwan, food processing accounted for 70 per cent of manufacturing 
output in 1914-16, and in spite of some attempt at diversification, the share of food processing 
increased to 73 per cent in 1938-40 (Ho 1984: Table 3). In Manchuria, the processing of soybean 
dominated manufacturing until the decline in output and exports in the 1930s. 
 
 During the 1930s, there was a rapid acceleration in industrial growth, and particularly 
manufacturing growth in both Korea and Manchuria, while in Taiwan the growth of mining and 
15 
manufacturing slowed after 1927 (Ho 1984: 366).
12
 In Korea the growth in manufacturing was 
from a very low base; as late as 1929, the industrial sector (mining, manufacturing, construction 
and utilities) accounted for around twelve per cent of GDP, which was low in comparison with 
most other Asian colonies (Table 3). Some scholars have argued that it was deliberate Japanese 
policy to keep industrialization to a minimum in this period so that Korea would remain a market 
for Japanese products (Kim 1973: 103). The growth during the 1930s was based on agricultural 
processing only to a limited extent; especially in the north the fast growing sectors were wood 
products, chemicals, ceramics, and machinery (Mizoguchi 1979: Table 7). By 1938-40, almost 62 
per of total manufacturing output in the north came from chemicals, and a further 17 per cent 
from metals, machinery and ceramics (Suh 1978: 142).  
 
 Most of the investment in the modern factory sector in Korea came from Japan; it has 
been estimated that 94 per cent of paid up capital in the Korean factory sector was owned by 
Japanese interests in 1940 (Haggard, Kang and Moon 1997: Table 5).
13
 In sectors such as 
electricity and gas and ceramics, Japanese firms accounted for 100 per cent of paid up capital. 
Many of the Japanese firms were owned by large Japanese conglomerates (zaibatsu) who were 
often given monopolies in particular sectors. These firms were closely tied to the Japanese 
government and pursued the goals set by government, which over the 1930s were determined by 
the military, rather than civilian interests (Chung 2006: 242-5). As Japan consolidated its power 
in Manchuria, and Japanese strategy became more oriented to building an empire stretching 
                                                          
12 From the mid-1930s, Japanese strategy was to promote industrialization in Taiwan through processing raw materials 
from China and Southeast Asia. Bauxite from Indonesia was to be processed using electricity from the newly 
constructed facility at Sun-Moon Lake (Schneider 1998: 182). But wartime transport problems prevented most of these 
schemes from coming to fruition. 
13 This figure has been disputed by Eckert (1991:54) who claims that it ignored the many Japanese-Korean joint 
ventures.  
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across northeastern Asia, the goals of Japanese policy in Korea became more tightly linked to 
development needs in Manchuria. Korea was viewed as a base for advance into the whole of 
North Asia (Chang 1971: 175). This had important consequences for Korean business ventures in 
Manchuria and for Korean migration, which will be considered further below. 
 
 Between 1934 and 1941, the growth of the modern factory sector in Manchuria was 
remarkably rapid at almost 20 per cent per annum in real terms (Chao 1983: 32). The whole 
industrial sector grew more slowly, at almost nine per cent per annum, but this was still a very 
fast rate in comparison with most other parts of the world at that time. By 1941, mining, 
manufacturing industry, and construction accounted for 20.3 per cent of GDP (Table 3). The role 
of heavy industry became more important; in 1938, metal industries, machinery, chemicals, 
electricity and gas accounted for 69 per cent of paid up capital in the manufacturing sector to 
sustain Japan’s war in Asia. The Japanese government, now running a war economy, had 
ambitious plans for the further development of Manchuria’s industrial capacity after 1942, when 
the second five year plan was initiated.
14
 Output of steel, pig iron and iron ore was to be nearly 
doubled by 1946 (Myers 1983: 143). Further development of hydro electricity, coal and shale oil 
was also planned. Had these targets been achieved, Manchuria would have had a more developed 
industrial sector than any other part of Asia, with the exception of Japan itself. But the Soviet 
Army’s invasion of Manchuria in 1945 led to massive falls in industrial output, from which the 
                                                          
14 Sun (1969: 79-80) argues that the first five year plan (1937-41) was basically the work of the Kwantung Army who 
were also in control of implementation. The army distrusted the older industrial groups such as Mitsui and Mitsubishi, 
and preferred to deal with the Nissan group.  
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economy was slow to recover. Sun (1969: 88) quotes an American estimate which valued the loss 
of plant at almost a billion dollars. This was confirmed by a Japanese estimate.
15
  
 
 The very rapid development of industry in both Korea and Manchuria until the early 
1940s can be contrasted not just with Taiwan, but also with most colonies in Southeast Asia. It 
was only in the 1930s that the Dutch began to encourage the growth of large-scale manufacturing 
through foreign investment in sectors including automobiles, rubber tires and tubes, soaps and 
cosmetics, batteries, cigarettes, electrical appliances and brewing (Shepherd 1941: 73). A measure 
of protection was granted the domestic textile sector, mainly by placing quotas on Japanese 
imports, and encouragement was given to small-scale weaving through the distribution of 
improved handlooms. The processing of crude petroleum into a number of refined products also 
grew rapidly. By 1941, the industrial sector accounted for 17.6 per cent of GDP (Table 3). 
Shepherd (1941: 110) argued that the severe impact of the world depression forced colonial 
authorities to take industrial policy more seriously in both Indonesia and Vietnam, whereas in the 
Philippines, export producers had the advantage of preferential access to the American market. 
This helped producers of sugar, vegetable oils and other processed agricultural products, in the 
same way that rice and sugar producers in Taiwan were assisted by access to the Japanese market. 
But it meant that any serious discussion of industrial policy was deferred until after 1945. 
 
3. Government Policies and the Development of the Private Sector 
                                                          
15 Further discussion of the damage to basic Manchurian industries inflicted during the Soviet occupation is given in 
Jones (1949: 227-31). Details of the post-1945 collapse are also given in several Chinese sources; see Ministry of 
Education (1989: 106-8) and Xu and Wu (1985: 106-8) 
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By the first decade of the twentieth century, all the colonial powers in East and South East Asia, 
were trying to establish effective administrative structures which prioritised the centralization 
and reform of fiscal systems. But there were considerable differences in outcomes of revenue 
policies in different parts of colonial Asia. Government revenues per capita in 1910 varied 
between around one dollar per capita in Vietnam to 15 dollars in the Federated Malay States 
(FMS).
16
 Although several of the colonies with low revenues per capita in 1910 improved their 
revenue performance over the next two decades, none caught up with either the FMS or the 
Straits Settlements. By 1929, government revenues in Indonesia, the Philippines, Korea and 
Burma were around five to six dollars per capita, more than in Thailand and Vietnam but still 
well below Taiwan, the Federated Malay States and the Straits Settlements. With the onset of the 
world depression, revenues fell in terms of dollars per capita in most colonies, and had not 
recovered to 1929 levels by 1938 (Booth 2007: Table 4.3).  
 
These differences in revenue performance can be explained partly by differences in 
taxable capacity, as proxied by per capita GDP, and partly by a reluctance on the part of several 
colonial regimes to increase taxes on the indigenous populations for fear of provoking unrest. A 
frequent criticism of colonial revenue systems in Asia was that they were regressive, in the sense 
that their incidence fell more heavily on indigenous populations than on foreign companies and 
individuals. Critics pointed to the high reliance on land taxes, excises and export and import 
duties. Income taxes on both corporations and individuals were either not assessed at all, as in 
British Malaya, or assessed at low rates with many exemptions. Non-tax revenues including 
opium, tobacco and alcohol monopolies were also considered regressive. These accounted for at 
                                                          
16 The very low figure for Vietnam could be partly the result of the exclusion of village-level imposts. 
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least one third of all government revenues in most Asian colonies in the late 1930s, including 
Taiwan and Korea (Booth 2007: Table 4.1).  
 
Table 4: Percentage of Budgetary Outlays on Law/Defence, Public Works/Agriculture 
and Education/Health, 1930s 
 
 
Country/Year Law/Police/ Public Works/ Education/ 
 Defence Agriculture Health 
 
Manchuria (1934) 32 5 * 3** 
Indonesia (1931) 32 7  12 
Thailand (1931) 31 15 8 
French Indochina (1931) 14 36 4 
Korea (1936) 11 31 7  
FMS*** (1931) 8 28 20 
Philippines (1931) 8 18 36 
Taiwan (1935) 7 28 8 
 
 
Note: *Expenditures on industry and communications. **Expenditures on education only. ***Federated 
Malay States. 
Sources: Korea: Grajdansev (1942: 218); Taiwan: Grajdansev (1944: 137); Manchuria (MYB 1941: 203-4); 
Others: Schwulst (1931: 57). 
 
Grajdanzev (1942: 135) argued that 80 to 90 per cent of all taxes in Taiwan fell on the 
mass of the population and only 10 per cent on the relatively wealthy, many of whom were 
Japanese. Kimura (1989: 302-4) also argued that Japanese revenue policies in Korea were 
regressive, and wealthier people, whether Japanese or Korean, escaped quite lightly. 
 
20 
On the expenditure side, all colonial governments in Asia had by 1913 begun to assume 
responsibility for a much broader range of activities than simply the maintenance of law and 
order and the collection of revenues. Kohli (2004: 40) describes the colonial state in Korea as a 
‘busy state’ which became increasingly involved in many developmental activities. But this was 
true in Southeast Asia as well. Increasingly, it was recognized that ambitious programs of 
infrastructural development were necessary for economic development, and would have to be 
funded, or at least subsidized, by government rather than the private sector, with government 
funds derived in part at least from loan finance. In Indonesia, where government expenditures 
had grown in real terms continuously after 1870, public works (including railways) accounted for 
40 per cent of total government expenditure in 1920 (Booth 1990: Table 10.5). In Burma, civil 
public works accounted for almost 24 per cent of government expenditures by 1901-4, although 
the percentage fell somewhat thereafter (Hlaing 1965: Table 22). In Indochina, especially the 
three provinces comprising what is now Vietnam, public works already accounted for 20 per cent 
of total government expenditures in 1901; by 1909 the share had risen to over 40 per cent. The 
concept of ‘mise en valeur’, stressed by successive French administrators after 1900, meant in 
effect increased expenditures on public works, in order to facilitate the exploitation of the 
colony’s natural resources (Doumer 1902: 24; Simoni 1929). 
 
But in spite of the increased emphasis on infrastructure, there were marked differences in 
spending priorities across colonial Asia. The comparative study carried out by Schwulst (1931) 
showed that the percentage of total budgetary expenditures on policing and defense varied from 
over 30 per cent in the Netherlands Indies and Siam to only eight per cent in the Philippines. The 
percentages in both the Netherlands Indies and Siam were higher than in Taiwan and Korea in 
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1935 and 1936 respectively (Table 4). The percentage of total expenditures devoted to public 
works and agriculture also varied considerably although it was lower in most Southeast Asian 
colonies than in either Taiwan or Korea. The percentage on health and education was under 15 
per cent in most colonies; the exceptions were the Philippines and the Federated Malay States. 
The Philippines spent over a third of the budget on health and education and the FMS around 20 
per cent; elsewhere the proportions were much lower. In both Taiwan and Korea, spending on 
education fell as a proportion of total expenditures after 1920, and never exceeded ten per cent of 
total expenditures (Booth 2007: Table 4.2). The outcomes in terms of educational and health 
indicators in various parts of colonial Asia will be examined further below.  
 
In Manchuria, government revenues and expenditures per capita in 1932 were lower than 
in either Taiwan or Korea in terms of yen per capita, although they increased rapidly after 1933 
and by 1938, they had almost caught up with Korea.
17
 But they remained much lower than in 
Taiwan (Tables 5 and 6).  
 
Table 5: Revenues Per Capita: Japanese Colonies: 1925-1938 (Yen) 
 
 
Year  Taiwan  Korea Kwantung* SMR  Manchuria 
     Zone 
   
1925  29 10 12 14 
1929  34 12 11 14 
1932  25 11   4 
1934  28 14   9 
                                                          
17 Sun (1969: 78) points out that historically public finance in Manchuria had been decentralized; the Manchukuo 
government was determined to reform the system. Kanai (1936: Chapter 5) gives an account of the reforms until 1935 
from a Japanese perspective. 
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1936  33 17   9 
1938  42 25   21 
 
 
Note: *Kwantung leased territory; SMR zone refers to land along the South Manchurian Railway. 
Sources; Mizoguchi and Umemura (1988: 256, 291-3). Expenditure figures from Kwantung and the SMR 
Zone from MYB (1933: 96-8). Population figures for Kwantung and the SMR Zone from Mizoguchi and 
Umemura (1988: 313-4). 
 
Table 6: Expenditures Per Capita: Japanese Colonies: 1925-1938 (Yen) 
 
Year  Taiwan  Korea Kwantung* SMR*  Manchuria 
     Zone 
   
1925  22 9 7 14 
1929  27 11 7 14 
1932  20 10   4 
1934  22 12   9 
1936  25 15   9 
1938  33 22   21 
 
 
Note: *Kwantung leased territory; SMR zone refers to land along the South Manchurian Railway. 
Sources; Mizoguchi and Umemura (1988: 256, 291-3). Expenditure figures from Kwantung and the SMR 
Zone from MYB (1933: 96-8). Population figures for Kwantung and the SMR Zone from Mizoguchi and 
Umemura (1988: 313-4). 
 
The share of spending on defence and policing fell from over 40 per cent in 1932 to 27.5 
per cent in 1935, which was lower than in either Siam or the Netherlands Indies (Table 4). Much 
of the military expenditure was for regional pacification (Myers 1982: 237). Most of the rest of 
the general account budget was devoted to administrative expenditures; expenditures on 
infrastructure were taken from the special account and from other sources. Myers (1982: 240) 
argued that dependence on the special account to finance development expenditures continued 
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throughout the period of Japanese control of Manchuria, but after 1938 reliance on debt to fund 
special account expenditures grew. 
 
 One of the most severe criticisms which has been made of colonial policies in 
many parts of the world is that colonial governments trapped the great majority of the 
population in unproductive activities, mainly in small-scale agriculture and in traditional 
manufacturing and services. This prevented the emergence of indigenous entrepreneurs, 
capable of managing modern firms. In Southeast Asia, this argument became entwined 
with the concept of the plural economy, characterized by a marked division of labour 
along ethnic lines. Furnivall (1948: 304-5) argued that the plural economy characterized 
most parts of Southeast Asia by the early 20
th
 century. In several Southeast cities, migrant 
Asians, mainly Chinese and Indian, comprised a significant share of the population, and 
accounted for the majority of workers in manufacturing, retail trade, construction and 
transport. In the Federated Malay States and in Indonesia outside Java, over 40 per cent 
of Chinese workers were in agriculture, mainly as estate labourers, but elsewhere the 
Chinese tended to work in manufacturing, commerce, transport and personal services 
with a small number in the professions (Booth 2012a: 74).  
 
As a broad generalization, it was true that no colonial government in Southeast 
Asia adopted policies which fostered the development of an indigenous entrepreneurial 
class, although the expansion of post-primary education in the Philippines must have 
encouraged many graduates to move into professional and administrative occupations. To 
a greater or lesser extent, many colonial officials tended to view indigenous populations 
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as lacking any talent for, or interest in, modern industry and commerce. Sometimes, this 
attitude manifested itself in outright racism. But other officials, both Dutch and British, 
were aware that at least some of the criticisms made of the business capacities of 
indigenous populations were unfair. Richard Windstedt, a prominent official in British 
Malaya argued that because most Malays were independent farmers with little need to 
work for hire, they had got an underserved reputation for idleness. But Winstedt, like 
most other administrators in British Malaya, thought that the provision of English-
language education to Malays should be restricted, lest they become restless and forsake 
their traditional way of life for one that would inevitably lead to exploitation and 
destitution (Booth 2012a: 86).
18
 
 
In Indonesia, van Gelderen (1961: 147) stressed that indigenous cultivators were 
likely to be exploited in their dealings with the market economy because of the great 
difference in bargaining power between the buyer on the one hand and the seller on the 
other. Paradoxically, in spite of Dutch concerns about the ability of indigenous 
Indonesians, and especially the Javanese, to participate in the ‘modern economy’, by 
1930 indigenous workers accounted for a higher proportion of the labour force in both 
Java and the Outer Islands of Indonesia than in the Straits Settlements, the Federated 
                                                          
18 Historians have contrasted British policy in Malaya with that of the Americans in the Philippines after 1900. The 
British were mainly concerned with the strategic goals of maintaining freedom of navigation through the Straits of 
Malacca and the South China Sea; to this end Singapore was developed as an important naval base and commercial 
entrepot. The Malay states were seen as important for the viability of Singapore, but indigenous Malays had to be 
protected from modern capitalism. A small number of Malay boys from elite families were given British education, but 
the rest were to remain in traditional occupations. In the Philippines, the Americans aimed to assimilate Filipinos into a 
modern state, resembling the western states of the USA. ‘The Americans aimed to cultivate the Filipinos in their own 
image, while the British sought to conserve Malay society to allow Malays to grow at their own racial pace.’ (Goh 
2013: 474) 
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Malay States, or Burma. The proportion was also higher than in Taiwan, about the same 
as Korea, and only slightly lower than in the Philippines. In Java, indigenous workers 
accounted for a higher proportion of workers in non-agricultural occupations than in any 
other colony except the Philippines (Booth 2012a: 79). Although it was probably true that 
many jobs occupied by indigenous Javanese required few skills (many were petty traders 
and homeworkers in cottage industry), they also outnumbered the Chinese and Europeans 
in professional occupations, and in the civil service. Even in trade where the Chinese 
were certainly important, indigenous workers comprised the majority of workers both in 
Java and elsewhere. 
 
 In Taiwan, Ho (1971: 323) claimed that the Japanese never encouraged the 
emergence of an indigenous business class. In fact he argued that the whole policy of the 
Japanese government ‘was directed toward preventing the emergence of such as class’. 
Until 1924, native Taiwanese were not allowed to organize or operate corporations unless 
there was Japanese participation. As a result, the modern sector of the economy became a 
monopoly of the Japanese capitalists. This changed little until 1945. In Korea, Juhn 
(1977: 48) pointed out that in the 1930s, when the Japanese authorities were trying to 
attract the large Japanese industrial conglomerates (zaibatsu) to invest in Korea, some 
officials did argue for a strategy that would encourage Korean small and medium 
enterprises. But there is little evidence that Korean firms received much encouragement. 
Neither did the activities of the Japanese-established cooperatives have any impact, 
especially when compared with small producers’ cooperatives in Japan (Juhn 1973: 28).  
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 But in spite of unsupportive Japanese policies, some Korean enterprises did 
emerge and grow during the colonial era. The outstanding example of an indigenous 
Korean industrial family that rose to wealth in the Japanese era was the Kim brothers 
who founded the Kyongsong Spinning Company. They managed to withstand 
competition from better-funded Japanese firms, consolidate their position in Korea and 
move into southern Manchuria (McNamara 1990: 117). McNamara (1988: 173) argued 
that the founding of the spinning factory in Manchuria was ‘a dramatic example of Kim’s 
ability to gain extensive Japanese support for a Korean-owned and managed industrial 
venture abroad’. Other Korean enterprises also were established in Manchuria, and 
Koreans also worked for both Japanese enterprises and the Manchurian government. 
Kohli (2004: 55) argues that, although much of the heavy industry was concentrated in 
the north, the Japanese left behind a ‘considerable density’ of entrepreneurship in the 
south which facilitated the post-1950 development of large-scale manufacturing.  
 
Korean as well as Japanese migrants moved to Manchuria; by 1939, there were 
642,300 Japanese in Manchuria who occupied senior positions in government and 
business.
19
 Official figures reported another 1.16 million Koreans, comprising 2.9 per 
cent of the local population. Koreans comprised the same percentage of the population in 
Manchuria as Japanese did in Korea. The Koreans worked mainly in intermediate 
occupations, while large numbers of migrants from China moved mainly into unskilled 
labouring jobs. Indigenous Manchurians were mainly employed in agriculture although 
small numbers moved into other occupations. Indeed, by the late 1930s, Manchuria was 
                                                          
19 Yamamuro (2006: 118-9) gives figures for the number of officials in Manchuria, derived from a document dated 
December 1935. From a total of 7,100 officials, 46 per cent were Japanese.  
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beginning to take on the characteristics of a plural economy in the Furnivall sense, where 
ethnicity and occupation were tightly linked. As Yamamura (2006: 201-2) argues, in spite 
of the substantial in-migration, Manchuria was hardly an ethnic melting pot. The 
Japanese had little or no contact with the other ethnic groups and lived apart from them. 
This was probably true of the other migrant groups as well who did not have a common 
language, and would have found communication with other migrants or with the 
indigenous population very difficult. 
 
4. Labour Migration and Labour Exploitation  
By the early 20
th
 century, large numbers of people were on the move across Asia. 
Between 1881 and 1910, gross immigration to Southeast Asia from India and China has 
been estimated at around 3.7 million, rising to 6.8 million in 1911-29. In the 1930s, 
numbers fell to 4.76 million. From 1911 onwards, gross flows to Southeast Asia 
exceeded those to the USA by a considerable margin (Huff and Caggiano 2007: Table 1). 
Net flows were much lower, because many of the migrants returned home; in British 
Malaya net flows were negative over the 1930s, although in other parts of the region they 
remained positive. Although most migrants came to Southeast Asia with the aim of 
saving money and eventually returning home, by the inter-war years many stayed and 
formed families in their host country. The decision to settle was the result of both adverse 
conditions at home and improving opportunities for migrant workers in Southeast Asia.
20
  
 
                                                          
20 Sugihara (2005: 254) points out that many migrants who arrived in the Straits Settlements did not stay there but 
moved to both the Malay states and to Sumatra to take advantage of job opportunities in the estates and mining. Some 
migration flows, such as those from Bangkok to British Malaya were not included in the official data. 
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 But migration from China and India to Southeast Asia was only part of the story 
of population movement across Asia in the early decades of the 20
th
 century. Migration 
from the Chinese mainland to Taiwan was small compared to the flows to Southeast 
Asia, although Schneider (1998: 169) claimed that between 1905 and 1935, the numbers 
of Chinese workers in Taiwan grew from 4,000 to 40,000. After a pause in the late 1930s, 
labour recruitment started again in 1940. Many mainlanders were admitted for seasonal 
work and had to go home after their contracts expired. All Chinese citizens in Taiwan 
were treated by the Japanese as foreigners, and from 1905 onwards, their numbers were 
much lower than the numbers of Japanese on the island (Grajdanzev 1942: 25). Lasker 
(1945: 99) estimated that by 1942, there were 310,000 Japanese in Taiwan, although only 
a small proportion would have been engaged in farming. A further 1.4 million were 
estimated to be in Korea and Manchuria.  
 
 Koreans were far more mobile than Japanese, moving in large numbers both to 
mainland Japan and to Manchuria, in search of higher wages and better conditions than 
were available at home. By 1940, the number of Koreans living outside Korea exceeded 
2.5 million, or about ten per cent of the total population in that year (Kimura 1993: 643). 
The great majority would have been in either Japan or Manchuria. Most were 
unsponsored (Chang 1971: 182). Yamanata et al (2008: 480) show that 1.36 million 
Koreans and Taiwanese were living in Manchuria by 1940; the number rose to 1.6 
million by 1942. Lasker (1945: 95) stated that the 1939 census in the Soviet Union found 
that over 180,000 Koreans were living in the Soviet Far East. During the Pacific War, 
Korean labour crews were found as far south as Papua New Guinea.  
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 While Koreans were probably the most mobile of all the major ethnic groups, 
relative to their total population, in colonial Asia, other ethnic groups were also on the 
move in search of employment opportunities. By the late 1930s it is probable that there 
were around 1.5 million ethnic Javanese living outside Java. Of these the majority were 
in other parts of Indonesia, particularly Sumatra. Many had gone to work on the estates in 
Eastern Sumatra as indentured labourers; the 1930 census found that 31.4 per cent of the 
indigenous population on the East Coast division had been born in Java. Conditions on 
the estates for migrant workers were often harsh, although the Dutch colonial government 
did introduce some measures to protect them as their numbers grew
21
. The same census 
found that there were 1.14 million people from Javan ethnic groups living in other parts 
of Indonesia (Hugo 1980: 109-10). Numbers of Javanese living elsewhere in the 
archipelago probably increased over the 1930s, not least because of the official 
government settlement policy, which moved families from Java over the 1930s.
22
 In 
addition some 170,000 Javanese were reported in the 1931 census to be living in British 
Malaya. 
 
 In Manchuria, the Japanese considered that economic development was held back 
by an acute shortage of labour, and government policy increasingly encouraged in-
migration from China. Schumpeter (1940: 69) gives a time series from 1926 to 1938 
which shows that arrivals peaked at over one million per year between 1927 and 1929, 
                                                          
21 A useful summary of the debate on Dutch policies can be found in Breman (2002).  
22 Pelzer (1945: 202) estimated that numbers ‘colonists’, mainly from Java and Bali, living in other parts of Indonesia 
trebled from 66,600 to 206,000 over the 1930s.  
30 
and fell thereafter, although they seldom dropped below 500,000 until 1938. As in 
Southeast Asia, net migration was lower, but only negative in two years. From 1937 to 
1941, migrant workers in the prime working age groups were recruited by Manchuria-
based Japanese companies and by the military, and their numbers grew rapidly over these 
years (Li et al. 2009: 8). The accumulated new entries from China Proper to Manchuria 
from 1932 to 1945 were estimated to be close to nine million (Li et al. 2009: 45). They 
played a key role in the mining and construction sectors.  
 
But labour shortages did not push up the workers’ wages despite initial promises 
made by the Japanese employers. Once inside Manchuria, these migrant workers were 
subject to systematic coercion, and had little protection. They were forced to live and 
work in harsh conditions characterized by daily violence, long working hours, inadequate 
housing, hunger and diseases. Their mortality rate has been put at over 30 percent (Li et 
al. 2009: 660), and their life expectancy after migrating 1.3 years. These were worse 
figures than for any other group of migrants in colonial Asia. As a result, according to a 
Japanese report of 1941, less than 20 per cent of the Chinese workers ever returned home 
(Li et al. 2009: 6). 
 
5. The Development of Education and Health Care and Changing Living Standards 
The debate over the treatment of migrant workers has become part of a wider debate 
about the provision of education and health facilities, and changing living standards 
across colonial Asia. Some scholars have argued that the Japanese placed more emphasis 
on educational development than other colonial powers in Asia. Kobayashi (1996: 325) 
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claimed that ‘the most immediate postwar legacy of the Japanese colonial era was the 
existence of the hundreds of thousands of educated South Koreans and Taiwanese who 
became the core of the postwar political and economic elites’. Other studies have also 
emphasized Japanese educational policies and contrasted them with much poorer 
outcomes in other colonies (Cumings 1999: 89). Does the evidence support such claims? 
The Japanese were quite successful in increasing school attendance in Taiwan at the 
primary level; by 1940 close to 60 per cent of school-age children attended primary 
school. But for the great majority of children in Taiwan, their education ceased after the 
primary cycle. Ten middle schools were located in the main towns; they were open to 
most Japanese but only carefully selected Taiwanese could attend (Kerr 1942: 53; 
Barclay 1954: 68). At the tertiary level there were very few opportunities in Taiwan, 
although a small number went to mainland Japan. After Taiwan was returned to China in 
1945, the ‘Japanese legacy’ was systematically removed by the Republican Government 
in a campaign of ‘de-Japanisation’ (qu ribenhua). All forms of Japanese political, 
economic and cultural influence were banned, and many Japan-trained bureaucrats, 
military personnel and teachers were removed from office. As a result, whatever their 
skills and experience, they had little input into post-1945 government administration. 
 
In Korea, the Japanese modernized primary education, introducing subjects such 
as geography, arithmetic and the Japanese language. Primary enrollment rates increased 
to over 70 per cent for boys and 20 per cent for girls by 1940 (Kimura 1993: 641). Many 
parents objected to the new syllabus, and some changes were made in the 1930s. Students 
often rebelled against what was seen as indoctrination to become loyal subjects of a 
32 
foreign emperor (Kim 1973: 139). The use of the education system to inculcate Japanese 
values into Korean children, and turn them against Christian and other ‘Western beliefs’ 
intensified over the 1930s (Brudnoy 1970: 187). By 1939, 1.3 million children were 
enrolled in ‘short course elementary schools’ although numbers in middle and high 
schools were much lower. At the tertiary level it was estimated that in 1943, there were 
28 institutions of higher learning; eleven were government-run and the rest private. They 
enrolled 4541 students, but only 1337 were Korean and the rest Japanese (Kim 1985: 
166-8). Kim argues that the Japanese attitude to higher education in Korea was that it was 
‘something dangerous and superfluous’. This was, to a considerable extent, the attitude of 
most other colonial governments in Asia, with one important exception, which will be 
discussed below. 
 
In Manchuria, the government of Manchoukuo also prohibited the use of 
textbooks which were considered anti-Japanese, but at the same time, they tried to 
modernize the curriculum, introduce vocational training, and improve the training of 
teachers. There was a considerable expansion in numbers of children attending school; as 
in Taiwan and Korea most of this expansion was at the primary level. Kanai (1936: 66) 
found that the great majority of children enrolled in school were at the primary level, 
although there was some growth in post-primary enrollments. In 1939, 3,820 students 
were enrolled in government and private higher education institutions; compared with 
Korea a higher proportion were from Manchuria, around 67 per cent. A small number 
were sent to Japan for higher education (MYB 1941; 677-80). In the late 1930s, only 
about 4.4 per cent of the Manchurian population was enrolled in school which was a 
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lower proportion than in Korea and much lower than in Taiwan. But as Tsurumi (1984: 
308) argued, Japanese policy in all three colonies was to replicate the ‘lower track of the 
two-track Meiji education system’. Education for eventual self-government was never 
part of Japanese colonial policy. 
 
This was also the case in the European colonies, where colonial regimes shared 
the Japanese reluctance to expose the indigenous populations to anything more than basic 
primary education. A partial exception was British Malaya where a number of schools 
were established by, and mainly for, for the Chinese population, often supported by 
philanthropists and churches. By the inter-war years, tertiary education was available in 
British Malaya, Burma, Indonesia, Vietnam and Thailand but only a very small number 
of students enrolled. The exception was the Philippines; in 1940-41 it was estimated that 
over two million students were enrolled in the public school system and a further 180,000 
in private schools. Of these, around 40,000 were in post-secondary institutions, some of 
which were religious foundations and some, including the University of the Philippines, 
established by government (Booth 2007: 139-40).  
 
The American emphasis on education, especially at the secondary and tertiary 
level, reflected the intention of successive American administrations to grant self-
government and eventual independence to the Philippines. It was argued that a substantial 
number of professional, technical and administrative workers would be required, and that 
the great majority would have to be educated in the colony. Even so, American 
educational policy was hardly an unqualified success. Many children, particularly in the 
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more remote rural areas, either did not enter school at all or dropped out before finishing 
sixth grade. A commission of enquiry in 1925 found that many classes were badly taught 
by teachers with little command of English. But in spite of the obvious deficiencies of the 
system, many bright young people from relatively humble backgrounds did manage to 
complete secondary and even tertiary schooling and move into employment in 
government administration or the private sector. By the end of the 1930s, almost all 
workers in manufacturing, trade and commerce and in public administration and the 
professions in the Philippines were indigenous, which was not the case in either the 
European or the Japanese colonies (Booth 2007: Table 6.4). 
        
 After 1901, the Dutch government was increasingly concerned about living 
standards in Java, and initiated several policies to increase food production, improve 
access to education and encourage migration from Java to Sumatra and Sulawesi. The 
Dutch were not alone in their concern about the living standards in their colony. In the 
early decades of the 20
th
 century, most colonial regimes in Asia were aware of the growth 
of nationalist movements wanting at least a greater measure of self-government, if not 
complete independence. By the 1920s, in the wake of the Russian revolution, colonial 
regimes had to deal with the threat of communist infiltration of independence 
movements, a threat which was present in the Japanese as well as the European colonies. 
Colonial statistical agencies were established, or expanded, and indicators of changing 
living standards carefully scrutinized.
23
  
 
                                                          
23 The work of the Institute of Pacific Relations was particularly important in carrying out research on living standards 
across the Pacific region (Holland 1995:2).  
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One widely used indicator was food availability per capita. Although rice yields 
per hectare were higher in both Korea and Taiwan than in Southeast Asia, per capita 
availability of rice was lower than in several parts of Southeast Asia, including British 
Malaya, Thailand, and French Indochina (Booth 2012b: Table 1). Furthermore, the 
statistics indicated that rice consumption per capita fell in both Korea and Taiwan, 
particularly over the 1930s, although in Korea the fall was continuous from 1915-19 to 
the 1930s (Grajdansev 1944: 118-9). The decline in Korea was attributed to the 
increasing amounts of rice land under the control of landlords, many of them Japanese. 
Much of the rice they grew was exported to Japan. Many Korean farmers subsisted off 
pearl millet, barley and wheat. There does seem to have been some improvement in 
average rice availability per capita in the latter part of the 1930s, although it was still 
below the average for 1911-13 (Table 7). 
 
In Taiwan, it has also been estimated that rice availability per capita fell steadily 
from the early 20
th
 century onwards (Table 7). To compensate for falling rice 
consumption, farmers consumed more sweet potatoes (Ho 1978: Table 6.2). Chang 
(1969: 51) argued that the substitution of rice for sweet potatoes reflected relative price 
changes rather than falling incomes. This is supported by the evidence that real per capita 
consumption expenditures in Taiwan increased steadily from 1911-13 to the end of the 
1930s. This was also the case in Korea, although Kimura (1993: 632) argued against 
reading too much into the average consumption data. Inequalities in consumer 
expenditure almost certainly increased in both Taiwan and Korea after 1910, although the 
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average increase over the 1930s must have reflected some improvement in consumption 
standards for the majority. 
 
Cha (1998: 751) attributes much of the fall in food consumption in Korea in the 
inter-war years to a ‘population explosion initiated by a health campaign and aggravated 
by the interwar agricultural depression’. That mortality dropped in both Taiwan and 
Korea after 1910 is confirmed by the data on crude death rates for both colonies (Table 
7).  
 
Table 7: Per Capita Consumption Expenditures, Rice Intake and Crude Death Rates in 
Taiwan and Korea (Annual Data) 
 
 
Year Per Capita Rice  Crude 
 Consumption Consumption Death 
 Expenditures Per capita Rates 
 (Yen: 1934-6 prices) (Kg) (per 1000)  
Taiwan 
1911-13  90*  134 26 
1926-28  104*  131 22 
1936-38  119*  92 20 
 
Korea  
1911-13  60  106** 34*** 
1926-28  80  77** 26*** 
1936-38  89  96** 23*** 
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Note: *Data refer to 1910-14, 1925-29, 1935-39. **Data refer to 1915-19, 1925-29, 1935-39. ***Data refer 
to 1910-1915, 1925-30, and 1935-1940. 
Sources: Population and crude death rates for Taiwan: Sato et al (2008: 233). Data on rice availability for 
Taiwan: Ho (1978: 94). Data on consumption expenditures for Taiwan and Korea, and population for 
Korea from Mizoguchi and Umemura (1988: 234, 238-9). Rice Consumption for Korea: Chang (1977: 58). 
Crude death rates for Korea: Kwon, Lee, Chang and Yu (1975: 23).  
 
Similar falls also occurred in most parts of Southeast Asia, where governments 
tried to reduce mortality, especially infant and child morality, through greater use of 
vaccination, and a variety of public health campaigns, including better education of 
mothers in child feeding practices. In those colonies for which we have a reliable time 
series, infant and child mortality, and crude death rates, did fall after 1900.
24
 By the late 
1930s, infant deaths per thousand births were around 140 in the Philippines, Taiwan, and 
British Malaya, but higher in Java, French Indochina, and Burma. Crude death rates were 
also higher in both Burma and Java than in Korea and Taiwan, or in British Malaya, 
Thailand and French Indochina (Booth 2012b: Table 4).  
 
The factors identified by Cha in the Korean case probably also caused the fall in 
rice and corn availability per capita in the Philippines between 1920-24 and 1935-39 
(Booth 2007: 137). Although the American administration tried to increase smallholder 
agricultural productivity, their policies had only limited success, while population grew 
rapidly, from an estimated 7.6 million in 1903 to 16 million in 1939. As in other parts of 
Asia, Filipinos compensated for declining availability of foodgrains by eating more 
                                                          
24 Data from various parts of Southeast Asia are given in Booth (2012b: 1165-70). While there was evidence of 
declining infant mortality rates in most parts of Southeast Asia, differences between ethnic groups were quite marked. 
Kimura (1993: 643) argues that death rates in Korea were under-reported in the early 20th century, and reporting 
improved after 1920, so the actual mortality decline could have been faster than official figures show. This was 
probably true in other parts of colonial Asia as well.  
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rootcrops, but studies carried out in the 1930s suggested that malnutrition was 
widespread in parts of the country (Booth 2012b: 1156-7). Elsewhere in Southeast Asia, 
the evidence is more mixed, although there was some fall in rice consumption in both 
Java and British Malaya in the 1930s (Booth 2007: 133).
25
  
 
6. Were the Japanese colonies more profitable? 
An argument frequently made by critics of western colonialism is that large profits were 
often made by capitalists, usually from the metropolitan country, which were remitted 
abroad, and did not benefit the local populations. In Southeast Asia, the most notorious 
example of the colonial drain in the 19
th
 century was Java during the cultivation system. 
Remittances from Java to the Netherlands amounted to at least six per cent of Java’s GDP 
between 1835 and 1865. Most of these remittances took the form of contributions to the 
Dutch budget (van Zanden and Marks 2012: 50). Although the budgetary contributions 
fell after 1870, remittances on private account grew from the late 19
th
 century onwards, 
and were substantial until the 1930s.
26
 In other colonies in Southeast Asia, commodity 
export surpluses were also considerable, and funded the outward flow of capital on the 
part of both large corporations and migrant workers (Booth 2007: 104-7). Colonial 
officials frequently defended the repatriation of profits on the grounds that they were a 
‘fair return’ on often risky investments made by capitalists in Europe and elsewhere. But 
post-colonial scholars have argued that the profits which expatriate firms in many parts of 
                                                          
25 The series compiled by Scheltema (1936: 12) showed that rice availability per capita fell from 117 kg in 1913-17 to 
95 kg in 1928-32. 
26 An analysis of Dutch income in and from Indonesia from 1700 to 1938 can be found in Maddison (1989). A further 
analysis of balance of payments surpluses which continued in Indonesia from the early 19th century to the 1960s era is 
given in Booth (1998: 210-14).  
39 
Southeast Asia made were larger than those which were made by firms in the 
metropolitan countries or in other parts of the word (Marseille 1984; 109-115; Lindblad 
1998: 80-81).  
 
    To what extent did the drain through the balance of payments also occur in the 
Japanese colonies? In the early years of the Japanese occupation of Taiwan, the balance 
of payments was in deficit, which was funded by Japanese government transfers to the 
new colony (Grajdansev 1942; 156-7; Mizoguchi and Yamomoto 1984: 407-411). But 
after 1909, the Taiwanese balance of payments became positive, and remained so for 
most years until the end of the 1930s. The surpluses were used to finance remittances on 
both government and private account to Japan. As Grajdansev (1942: 158-9) has argued, 
these remittances represented interest and profits on the capital invested by the Japanese 
in Taiwan. Did this represent a fair return on capital invested? Grajdansev argued that the 
amounts remitted to Japan were rather more than a legitimate return on Japanese 
managerial and entrepreurial ability, and reflected the protection from both local and 
foreign competition which was granted to Japanese companies in the colony.  
 
In sharp contrast to Taiwan, the balance of payments in Korea was persistently in 
deficit for much of the period from 1910 onwards (Mizoguchi and Yamomoto 1984: 
411). This was the result of the long-term government subsidy and private capital flows 
from Japan; Mizoguchi and Yamamoto estimate that these flows were large enough to 
cover government spending on capital formation for most years until 1935. They argued 
that these flows reflected the inability of the colonial government to mobilize funds from 
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within the colony, rather than a lack of profits on the part of private investors. Much the 
same was true of Manchuria, where the balance of payments was also in deficit from 
1934 onwards. As in Korea, imports exceeded exports over these years, a tendency which 
was expected to persist for many years to come (MYB 1941: 311). But critics pointed out 
that the terms of trade favoured Japanese enterprises: the price level of imports from 
Japan to Manchuria increased by up to 30 percent while the prices of exports to Japan 
declined (Xie 2007: 548). In the process, Japanese firms often earned high profits, 
especially in the mining sector (Li et al. 2009: 359).
 
 Wu (1955: 93) argued that large 
sums, worth over a third of Japan’s total investment in Manchuria, were remitted back to 
Japan from 1932 to 1944. 
 
But in spite of the evidence that some Japanese investments in their colonies were 
profitable, by the 1930s both foreign scholars and Japanese business groups were voicing 
doubts about the benefits of the colonies to the Japanese economy. An American study of 
the Japanese economy claimed that, at the end of the 1920s, from a fiscal point of view, 
‘the colonies as a whole have thus far clearly been a liability rather than an asset’ 
(Moulton 1931: 180). In the early part of the 1930s, the private sector in Japan looked to 
the colonies, especially Manchuria, as providing relief from slowing growth at home 
(Young 1998: 201). In addition, the need for new markets for consumer goods exports 
became more pressing as access to markets in South and Southeast Asia and Africa was 
curtailed by the protectionist policies of Britain, France, the Netherlands and the USA. 
But demand in Korea and Manchuria was for producer goods; local populations were too 
poor to provide a large market for consumer products. Even the growing demand for 
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capital goods was not viewed as an unmitigated blessing to Japan. Young (1998: 234) 
quoted a speech by the president of Mitsubishi Heavy Industries in 1940, pointing out 
that the diversion of plant and equipment to Manchuria was causing shortages at home. 
Bankers also complained at what were seen as excessive demands for loans in Manchuria 
which was causing problems in the Japanese financial market. 
 
 A complete assessment of the costs and benefits of the empire to Japan has yet to 
be carried out. It is possible that such an assessment would reach the same conclusion as 
that of Davis and Huttenback (1986) for the British Empire. These authors concluded that 
the British economy as a whole did not benefit from the empire, even if individual 
companies did
27
. Certainly it is difficult to agree with the assertion of Liberman (1996; 
112) that ‘empire paid handsomely for Japan, at least until the invasion of China in 
1937’. Only Taiwan, with its relatively high per capita GDP, was profitable to the mother 
country in the sense that several Southeast Asian colonies were. Korea and Manchuria 
received considerable direct government support, as well as government subsidies to 
encourage private firms to invest in mining, manufacturing and services. In the longer run 
the massive Japanese investment in Korea and Manchuria might have paid off, but the 
defeat at the hands of the allies in 1945 meant that Japan was unable to reap the benefits.  
 
Conclusions 
 
                                                          
27 It is likely that British Malaya was of greater benefit to the British economy than most of its other possessions (White 
1999). The colony was an important earner of dollars for the sterling area both before and after the Pacific War through 
its exports of rubber and tin to the USA.  
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The main purpose of this paper has been to assemble statistical and other evidence on 
economic and social development across colonies in East and Southeast Asia in the 
decades from 1900 to 1940. Our main conclusion is that the argument that Japanese 
policies were uniformly more ‘developmental’ than the policies pursued by other colonial 
powers in Southeast Asia is not always supported. The strongest case for Japanese 
exceptionalism can probably be made for Taiwan, although even here access to post-
primary education was very limited and other indicators of living standards including 
food consumption and mortality were little different from the Philippines and most parts 
of British Malaya. While it is true, as Peattie (1984: 23) argued, that the Japanese 
administration could have transferred its own successful modernization efforts to Taiwan, 
in fact Japanese policies came increasingly to resemble those in other parts of colonial 
Asia. Trade with the rest of the world was severely constrained, while that with Japan 
was mainly based on the exchange of agricultural products for manufactures. 
Industrialization was limited to agricultural processing, and for most years after 1910, the 
balance of payments was in surplus, and substantial sums were remitted back to Japan. 
Education was restricted to primary schooling, and there were few opportunities for 
indigenous Taiwanese to occupy skilled jobs in the non-agricultural sector. By the late 
1930s per capita GDP in Taiwan was higher than in Indonesia, Burma and Thailand, but 
probably little different from the Philippines, or British Malaya.  
 
 In Korea, per capita GDP was almost certainly lower than in Taiwan, and other 
indicators including educational attainment, mortality and consumption expenditures 
were also lower. While it is possible that the massive Japanese investment that took place 
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in both Korea and Manchuria would have paid off in the longer run, Japan’s defeat and 
subsequent political upheavals in both these regions wiped out much of the progress 
which occurred during the Japanese occupation. But in Korea there was already a small 
class of educated Koreans when Japanese colonial control was established. Given that the 
Japanese dominated the upper echelons of the civil service, some chose to go into 
business; some moved to Manchuria to pursue commercial opportunities there. When the 
Republic of Korea was established after the bitter civil war of the early 1950s, there was 
already an indigenous business class which drove the rapid industrial growth for which 
Korea has became famous. 
 
 The Americans were unique in Asia in their policy of encouraging self-
government, and eventual independence in the Philippines, which meant a much greater 
emphasis on secondary and tertiary education than in other colonies, whether French, 
British, Dutch or Japanese. By the 1930s, Filipinos occupied almost all the posts in the 
civil service, and many moved into private business and the professions. American policy 
in the Philippines has been contrasted with that of the British in Malaya. Here colonial 
officials felt that the Malays had to be protected from capitalism, which meant keeping 
them in the traditional occupations while encouraging in-migration from China and India 
in order to provide wage labour in estates and mines. The Dutch shared the doubts of the 
British concerning the entrepreneurial abilities of indigenous Indonesians, and limited 
access to Dutch-language education to a small number of Indonesians from elite families. 
The French also paid little attention to the development of formal education.  
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   Many studies of Japanese colonial policies have stressed the achievements in 
building infrastructure. But here there were many similarities with the achievements of 
the British, Dutch and French colonial regimes in other parts of Asia. In all cases, 
colonial engineers were able to draw on expertise in the metropolitan countries, built up 
over many decades, to construct railways, roads and irrigation works. Dutch 
achievements in Java were broadly comparable to those of the Japanese in Taiwan; the 
Dutch were able to draw on centuries of experience in managing water in their homeland 
to build large-scale irrigation works which survive to this day. Railway and road 
construction was also developed in both islands, at least partly to serve the needs of 
agricultural processing industries, especially sugar, where cane had to be transported to 
the mills rapidly after cutting. Critics of infrastructure development in colonial Asia have 
argued that it was largely developed to serve the needs of investors from the metropolitan 
power. This was often the case, but it seems to be just as true in Japanese-controlled 
regions as elsewhere. 
 
 We are left with a final, very important question. If indeed it was the case that 
Japanese policies were not unique in their emphasis on economic development, then how 
do we explain the remarkable growth performance of Taiwan and the Republic of Korea 
after Japanese colonialism was ended in 1945? How do we explain the slower pace of 
economic growth in Indonesia, the Philippines, Burma, Vietnam and Malaysia after these 
countries became independent? A full answer to these questions is beyond the scope of 
this paper. But the nature of the decolonization process was of crucial importance. In 
several cases, notably Indonesia and Vietnam, independence was only conceded after 
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bitter conflict with the Dutch and French. In Vietnam, the country was divided into two 
opposing regimes, which triggered two decades of further conflict. Elsewhere the newly 
independent nations faced regional rebellions, often based on the resentment felt by 
ethnic and religious minorities against the central government. In Malaysia, the 
federation put together by the British lasted only two years before Singapore withdrew to 
become an independent state. Southeast Asia remained turbulent region for more than 
two decades after the end of the Pacific War. In seeking to explain the stellar growth of at 
least part of the former Japanese empire, and the slower growth of other Asian colonies, 
we must focus on developments after 1945.  
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